10/23 The Philosophy of Disability: Rethinking What is 'Normal'

What is a normal mind - and who gets to decide? For neurodivergent and chronically ill students, that question isn’t abstract; it shapes how we’re taught, treated, and understood.

This week, the Duke Neurodiversity Advocates (DNA) will begin a two-part series on the Philosophy of Disability, starting with a deep dive into how the concept of “normal” came to define our ideas of ability and intelligence.

In Part I, we’ll look at how medicine, education, and culture have constructed the idea of the “typical brain.” Why are some cognitive styles - focus, memory, processing speed - valued as signs of intellect, while others are seen as impairment? How do neurodiversity and disability theory challenge those assumptions?

Together, we’ll explore frameworks that view disability and neurodivergence not as defects to fix but as forms of human variation that expand our understanding of what the mind can do. Through thinkers like Elizabeth Barnes, Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, and Shelley Tremain, we’ll ask what happens when the boundaries between “normal” and “different” start to blur.

Suggested Readings (Part I)

• Garland-Thomson (2011). Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability Concept. Hypatia.

• Barnes (2016). The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability. Oxford University Press. (Ch. 1–2)

• Tremain (2020). Foucault and Feminist Philosophy of Disability. University of Michigan Press. (Introduction)